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Abstract
In this paper we present a key exchange protocol in which Alice
and Bob have secret keys given by quadric surfaces embedded in a
large ambient space by means of the Veronese embedding and pub-
lic keys given by hyperplanes containing the embedded quadrics.
Both of them reconstruct the isomorphism class of the intersection
which is a curve of genus 1, which is uniquely determined by the
j-invariant. An eavesdropper, to find this j-invariant, has to solve
problems which are conjecturally quantum resistant.
Keywords: Quadric surfaces Veronese embedding Segre embed-
ding Post-quantum cryptography.
1 Introduction
Bringing difficult mathematical problems to cryptography is required not
only to connect abstract mathematics to the real world applications but
also to make cryptography stronger and applicable. Many classical math-
ematical problems like factorization and discrete logarithm are vulnerable
to quantum attack after the algorithm by Shor [9] in 1994. The algorithm
∗This author is supported by INdAM Fellowship Programs in Mathematics and/or
Applications cofunded by Marie Skodowska-Curie Actions.
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by Shor created a threat to the cryptographic world and then the necessity
of the post-quantum system was realized. In 2016, the United States gov-
ernment agency National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
put a call for new post-quantum cryptographic algorithms to systematize
the post-quantum candidates in near future [11] and in 2019 declared the
17 candidates for public-key encryption and key-establishment algorithms
and 9 candidates for digital signatures [10] based on various mathematical
problems. Currently, there are five major post-quantum areas of research
are carried out, four of them are discussed in [3] including lattice-based
cryptography based on lattice problems, code-based cryptography based
on decoding a generic linear code, which is an NP-complete problem [2],
multivariate cryptography based on the difficulty of inverting a multivari-
ate quadratic map or equivalently to solving a set of quadratic equations
over a finite field which is an NP-hard problem, hash-based cryptography
based on one way hash functions and isogeny based cryptography based
on isogeny problems, see for ex. [5, 4].
In this paper, we propose a key exchange protocol whose security relies on
various problems in computational algebraic geometry, like solving large
system of polynomial equations with high degree in many variables, or
finding the primary decomposition of an ideal generated by many poly-
nomials in many variables, which we conjecture to be quantum-safe prob-
lems.
In a nutshell: Alice chooses a quadric surface embedded in a large pro-
jective space by the means of the Segre and the Veronese map. She gives
some information like an embedding and an automorphism of the vari-
ety so that Bob can generate an embedding which is required to agree on
a common key. Both Bob and Alice have their respective embeddings by
which they hide their secret quadric surfaces, instead they publish their
corresponding hyperplanes containing the images of their respective em-
beddings. Now, by using their private embeddings they compute the pull-
back of each other’s hyperplanes, recover a (2, 2) homogeneous curve and
finally compute the j-invariant of the components. Under some heuris-
tic assumptions, both parties are able to get such components with high
probability. The j-invariants are equal, which is the common keys for both
Alice and Bob. Notwithstanding the availability of the public data, an at-
tacker is not able to recover information on private data because of the
assumptions on the underlying problems.
In section 2 and section 3 we recall some terminologies that are used
everywhere in this paper. In section 4 we give a key exchange protocol
called Quadratic Surface Intersection (QSI) key exchange and a variant of
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it. In section 5 we present the QSI key exchange protocol in a scenario of a
trusted third party. In section 6 we discuss some underlying mathematical
problems and hardness assumptions. We also give appendices to fulfill
some extra arguments.
2 Intersection of quadric surfaces
The intersection of two quadric surfaces in P3 is a curve of degree 4. The
geometric properties of this curve are well known. In this section, we have
taken most of the terminologies from [12, 7, 8] unless otherwise stated.
Proposition 2.1. Let κ be an algebraically closed field. Then, for a general choice
of two quadric surfaces Q1, Q2 ⊂ P3κ, Q1 ∩Q2 is a smooth curve of genus 1.
The proposition 2.1 suggests that the intersection of two quadric sur-
faces is expected to be isomorphic to an elliptic curve, whose isomorphism
class is determined by the j-invariant. We describe a way to compute the
j-invariant of an intersection of two quadric surfaces.
Definition 2.2. The standard Segre embeddings are a family of morphisms of
projective variety
Pn ×Pm PNn,m
([X0 : . . . : Xn], [Y0 : . . . : Ym]) [X0Y0 : ... : XnYm]
sn,m
where Nn,m = (m + 1)(n + 1) − 1 and the sequence [XiYj] is ordered by the
standard lexicographical order. The images of these embeddings are called stan-
dard Segre varieties and they are denoted by the symbol Σn,m. They are essentially
isomorphic copies of Pn ×Pm inside PNn,m .
Example 2.3. Σ1,1 ⊂ P3 is the smooth quadric surface defined by the equation
X0X3 = X1X2
Example 2.3 gives an easy characterization of the intersection of two
smooth quadric surfaces Q1, Q2. We recall a basic result in Algebraic Ge-
ometry.
Lemma 2.4. All the smooth quadric hypersurfaces of Pn are projectively isomor-
phic.
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Suppose we have two smooth quadric surfaces Q1 and Q2. From lemma
2.4 and example 2.3 we can choose a projectivity f : P3 → P3 such that
f (Q1) = Σ1,1. Assume that Q1 = Σ1,1, then s−11,1(Q2) ∼= Q1 ∩ Q2. Let
F2(Z0, Z1, Z2, Z3) be the quadratic form defining Q2, then s−11,1(Q2) is de-
fined in P1 ×P1 by a bi-homogeneous polynomial of bi-degree (2,2)
G(X0, X1; Y0, Y1) := F2(X0Y0, X0Y1, X1Y0, X1Y1)
which is called the ”pullback” of the polynomial F2 through s1,1. Hence, in
particular every intersection of two smooth quadric surfaces is isomorphic
to the zero locus of a polynomial of bi-degree (2,2) in P1 × P1. The next
proposition explains how to compute the j-invariant of a curve defined in
that way.
Proposition 2.5. Let C ⊂ P1×P1 be a smooth curve defined by a bi-homogeneous
polynomial of bi-degree (2,2) over a field of characteristic different from 0 and 3.
F(X0, X1; Y0, Y1) = Y20 F0(X0, X1) +Y0Y1F1(X0, X1) +Y
2
1 F2(X0, X1).
Define G(X0, X1) := F21 − 4F0F2 and write
G(X0, X1) = q0X40 + q1X
3
0X1 + q2X
2
0X
1
1 + q3X0X
3
1 + q4X
4
1
Define
S := q0q4 − q1q34 +
q2
12
T :=
q0q2q4
6
+
q1q2q3
48
− q
3
2
216
− q0q
2
3
16
− q
2
1q4
16
Then j(C) =
S3
S3 − 27T2 .
Proof. See appendix B.
3 Segre and Veronese embeddings
We recall here the general notion of Segre and Veronese embeddings. We
already defined the standard Segre embeddings in section 2. A general
Segre embedding is a composition of the standard Segre embedding and a
projective automorphism of the ambient space of the codomain, which is
represented by a square matrix.
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Definition 3.1. Let n, m ∈N, Nn,m := (m+ 1)(n+ 1)− 1 and M ∈ GL(Nn,m +
1). Then we define
sMn,m := M ◦ sn,m, ΣMn,m := MΣn,m
to be respectively the Segre embedding and the Segre Variety represented by the
matrix M.
Remark 3.2. Since all the smooth quadric surfaces of P3 are projectively isomor-
phic, then each of them is equal to some ΣMn,m.
Example 3.3. Let
M :=

1 −2 3 0
0 −1 1 −5
8 3 1 −1
1 0 0 1

be a matrix, then it represents the non-standard Segre embedding
P1 ×P1 P3
([
X0
X1
]
,
[
Y0
Y1
]) 
X0Y0 − 2X0Y1 + 3X1Y0
−X0Y1 + X1Y0 − 5X1Y1
8X0Y0 + 3X0Y1 + X1Y0 − X1Y1
X0Y0 + X1Y1

SM1,1
We now define Veronese embeddings, which are copies ofPn in a larger
ambient space.
Definition 3.4. Let n, m ∈ N, then the standard Veronese embedding is the
morphism
Pn P(
n+m
m )−1
[X0 : · · · : Xn] [Xm0 : · · · : Xmn ]
vn,m
where the sequence [Xm0 : · · · : Xmn ] is ordered by the lexicographical order. The
images of these embeddings are called standard Veronese varieties and they are
denoted by Vn,m.
Definition 3.5. Let n, m ∈ N, Nn,m := (n+mm )− 1 and M ∈ GL(Nn,m + 1).
Then we define
vMn,m := M ◦ vn,m, VMn,m := MVn,m
to be respectively the Veronese embedding and the Veronese variety represented
by the matrix M.
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For our purposes we are interested in Segre embeddings sM1,1, the Veronese
embeddings vM
′
3,m. We give a name to their composition.
Definition 3.6. We call σ-embedding any composition vM
′
3,m ◦ sM1,1.
Any σ-embedding is represented by a (N3,m + 1)× (m+ 1)2 matrix M.
It is defined by the condition
σ([X0, X1], [Y0, Y1]) = M ·
Xm0 Ym0:
Xm1 Y
m
1

We now describe how to construct automorphisms of the Veronese va-
rieties. First of all we describe a natural multiplicative group homomor-
phism
GLEmb(n, m) : GL(n + 1)→ GL(Nn,m)
arising from the standard Veronese embedding vn,m. Let A := (aij)i,j∈{0,...,n} ∈
GL(n + 1). It corresponds to an action on the coordinates
Xi 7→ Li :=
n
∑
j=0
aijXj, i ∈ {0, .., n}
There is a natural action induced on the monomials of any fixed degree, in
fact
Xe00 · · ·Xenn 7→ Le00 · · · Lenn
We denote by GL(n, m)(A) the matrix representing the action of A on the
homogeneous polynomials of degree m with respect to the monomial basis
with the standard lexicographical order.
Definition 3.7. We call general linear group embedding associated to the stan-
dard Veronese embedding vn,m the function GLEmb(n, m), which is defined above.
Example 3.8. In the case n = 1, m = 2, Nn,m = 2 a general matrix
(
a b
c d
)
∈
GL(2) acts on the coordinates
X0 7→ aX0 + bX1
X1 7→ cX0 + dX1
Then the action on the monomials of degree 2 is the following
X20 7→ a2X20 + 2abX0X1 + b2X21
X0X1 7→ acX20 + (ad + bc)X0X1 + bdX21
X21 7→ c2X20 + 2cdX0X1 + d2X21
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So GLEmb(1, 2)
(
a b
c d
)
=
a2 2ab b2ac ad + bc bd
c2 2cd d2

The subgroup Im(GLEmb(n, m)) ⊂ GL(Nn,m + 1) corresponds to the
set of automorphisms of PNn,m which fix Vn,m. We can construct matrices
representing automorphisms of any Veronese variety VMn,m.
Proposition 3.9. Aut(VMn,m) := M Im(GL(n, m))M−1
Proof. It is a general fact
Aut(MX) = M Aut(X)M−1
for any X ⊂ PN projective subvariety, for any M ∈ GL(N + 1).
4 Quadratic Surface Intersection (QSI) Key Ex-
change
In the proposed key exchange protocol both Alice and Bob choose random
quadric surfaces. The common key is the isomorphism class of the curve
intersection of those quadrics, namely its j-invariant. To make the ex-
change secure the quadric surface is embedded in a large projective space
through a non-standard Veronese embedding. Any user U has a private
data given by a non-standard Veronese embedding of P3 represented by a
Nn,m × Nn,m matrix. The user has also a private data given by the isomor-
phic copy of quadric surface inside the chosen Veronese variety. U also
needs to publish some data in order to allow anyone who wants to con-
tact him to produce a distinct and random quadric surface: for this pur-
pose he publishes some automorphisms of the Veronese variety and the
user chooses another quadric surface (distinct from the private one) inside
it. These information should not allow any eavesdropper to recover the
Veronese embedding chosen by U.
4.1 QSI algorithm first version.
The algorithm is comprised of key generation and the key exchange.
User key construction:
1. U chooses a finite field Fq.
2. U chooses m ∈N+ and computes N = (m+33 )− 1.
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3. U chooses a non-standard Veronese embedding
vMU3,m : P
3 → MU ·V3,m ⊂ PN
represented by the matrix MU ∈ GL(N + 1).
4. U constructs some automorphisms of MU · V3,m by using the homo-
morphism GLEmb(3, m). U chooses a set of automorphisms of P3
of order q4− 1 (with a characteristic polynomial irreducible over Fq)
{U′i}1≤i≤t ⊂ GL(4) and then he computes
Ui := MU GLEmb(3, m)(Ui’) M−1U
we assume that t = 2 is the most appropriate one.
5. U constructs a secret quadric surface inside MU ·V3,m, more precisely
a σ-embedding
σ
(s)
U : P
1 ×P1 → MU ·V3,m ⊂ PN
represented by a (N + 1)× (m+ 1)2 matrix M(s)U . U constructs also a
hyperplane HU ⊂ PN containing Im(σ(s)U ), which is represented by
a vector in coker(M(s)U ) ⊂ FN+1q .
6. U constructs a public quadric surface inside MU · V3,m, more pre-
cisely a σ-embedding
σ
(p)
U : P
1 ×P1 → MU ·V3,m ⊂ PN
represented by a N + 1× (m + 1)2 matrix M(p)U .
The key exchange is asymmetric since the common keys are different de-
pending on if Alice wants to contact Bob or vice versa. Suppose that Bob
wants to contact Alice.
Alice public keys:
• The field Fq.
• m ∈N+.
• Two matrices A1, A2 ∈ GL(N + 1), where N = (m+33 )− 1.
• The (N + 1)× (m + 1)2 matrix M(p)A .
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• The hyperplane HA ∈ FN+1q .
Alice secret keys:
• The matrix M(s)A .
Key Exchange:
1. Bob chooses m1, m2, m′1, m
′
2 ∈ {0, ..., q4 − 1} and then computes
M′B := A
m1
1 A
m2
2 A
m′1
1 A
m′2
2 .
2. Bob computes the matrix MB := M′B · M(p)A . This corresponds to a
choice of a σ-embedding σB : P1 ×P1 → PN.
3. Bob computes a random HB ∈ coker(MB) and sends it to Alice. This
corresponds to a hyperplane containing Im(σB).
4. Bob computes the pullback σ∗BHA. It is a curve in P
1×P1 defined by
a curve of bi-degree (m, m). He uses a factorization algorithm to find
a component of bi-degree (2,2) then he computes its j-invariant jB ∈
Fq. The probability that the residue curve of bi-degree (m− 2, m− 2)
is reducible is negligible (see appendix B for more details), so the jB
is well determined except for m = 4.
5. Alice computes the pullback σ(s)A
∗
HB. She finds the component of
bi-degree (2,2), then she computes its j-invariant jA ∈ Fq.
jA = jB is the common key of Alice and Bob.
Example 4.1. (Toy Example) Key Generation: A finite field Fq with q = 67,
m = 3. Alice chooses a random matrix
MA =

56 21 22 46 19 30 54 59 17 23 35 17 18 60 13 54 27 43 55 16
42 1 54 49 3 29 9 1 34 65 35 65 34 47 27 4 25 53 27 17
29 3 59 56 50 44 36 27 63 33 3 15 4 36 28 32 3 50 29 56
62 53 21 31 23 50 28 37 13 62 16 27 29 27 66 44 40 42 60 55
9 2 58 4 50 2 63 34 10 1 27 34 14 17 11 61 4 48 36 61
35 63 13 66 50 14 23 42 23 58 22 14 6 29 52 58 36 9 42 0
61 64 15 65 57 44 54 60 11 4 25 37 29 5 56 9 9 11 57 31
40 42 2 48 28 26 31 9 8 15 62 31 53 46 12 39 46 52 30 8
29 28 40 29 36 62 32 57 47 25 11 10 55 8 39 43 3 66 64 29
61 63 24 42 43 15 18 63 21 64 60 14 26 8 12 0 23 61 28 66
55 21 48 0 47 17 20 22 61 65 49 5 24 43 51 24 62 14 41 42
34 25 43 37 36 11 16 11 65 59 61 54 22 66 66 49 28 20 26 3
0 38 53 16 44 46 21 64 54 5 39 2 64 28 61 30 53 1 34 58
18 65 52 54 6 31 43 3 46 7 5 26 29 55 39 65 12 4 33 63
49 59 43 54 46 14 16 4 30 40 29 1 48 59 22 2 8 14 30 33
34 46 63 8 14 51 1 29 6 52 46 47 25 9 13 28 8 33 25 34
48 31 6 62 34 49 16 60 32 21 55 22 2 23 35 20 62 0 64 15
33 45 48 62 5 0 1 65 66 35 43 34 5 18 11 57 41 6 53 41
12 24 28 36 4 18 31 34 1 21 65 13 1 31 43 9 23 43 66 13
41 9 45 49 6 38 40 4 50 45 10 14 13 18 40 23 6 33 13 39

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which represents a choice of a Veronese embedding
vA : P3 → VA ⊂ P19.
She produces a random automorphism of the Veronese variety VA which is given
by a matrix
A1 =

60 55 21 17 53 5 30 53 30 25 36 1 40 46 14 36 27 7 54 54
0 59 51 65 25 62 57 4 23 55 8 53 8 34 36 24 36 33 55 60
56 34 7 35 10 39 18 64 62 49 23 10 41 28 0 12 1 52 51 51
61 42 35 43 29 44 30 35 28 61 6 48 30 54 21 37 8 21 48 0
37 20 42 4 23 25 26 47 3 46 31 49 13 12 40 21 10 66 12 38
27 39 26 35 4 43 35 48 5 57 56 28 55 65 15 23 27 43 41 53
54 9 7 15 21 21 8 57 40 22 50 55 29 46 39 42 44 21 39 32
3 17 9 43 3 48 38 49 24 5 20 60 56 57 31 18 53 57 21 43
63 20 4 44 2 30 16 26 21 23 40 42 6 28 26 23 40 62 54 1
23 6 0 50 47 46 29 17 62 62 32 55 26 22 27 65 29 25 65 11
66 16 65 60 8 34 21 43 49 64 3 20 37 49 1 9 58 39 20 5
38 19 30 22 11 15 20 9 16 1 65 12 17 1 56 41 4 21 44 19
15 16 16 4 26 61 62 16 6 36 33 33 30 2 35 56 65 59 33 46
44 22 9 56 57 11 10 6 14 22 24 58 49 32 35 58 4 14 53 48
65 26 24 24 48 57 14 44 0 39 18 45 35 19 21 59 56 63 1 3
39 24 5 34 46 14 31 14 59 40 1 38 43 46 40 21 33 65 20 36
54 55 41 7 17 58 13 30 1 66 53 41 15 47 66 65 58 34 0 41
55 37 41 32 11 42 38 25 43 9 33 7 31 25 59 3 45 61 36 36
39 26 46 66 50 5 52 14 2 3 15 25 22 27 65 4 56 58 27 60
46 35 61 39 20 51 21 50 55 29 18 38 12 46 59 51 2 43 15 31

and she keeps the secret embedding
σ
(s)
A : P
1 ×P1 → P19
represented by the matrix
M(s)A =

9 17 23 59 50 10 11 36 64 56 27 16 40 62 8 6
34 48 49 26 25 58 16 33 36 2 43 4 62 39 17 34
3 49 33 24 26 64 66 46 63 17 61 49 14 43 65 23
37 45 12 60 27 5 29 3 33 51 7 30 11 47 40 44
54 57 19 25 13 14 37 23 24 39 21 41 58 41 65 64
40 18 2 44 64 32 17 15 42 15 27 30 45 22 39 49
46 10 38 59 31 36 1 28 18 51 46 19 5 8 31 26
45 65 39 32 35 6 18 65 12 0 17 59 65 4 26 5
4 14 13 27 43 58 63 66 41 57 39 12 30 43 25 7
4 1 6 25 49 11 40 48 20 30 52 29 35 23 35 3
31 5 63 25 63 2 20 62 32 13 43 24 18 14 40 14
21 38 7 31 46 50 3 27 8 59 47 21 29 53 22 1
9 55 21 31 48 5 20 66 9 33 28 0 45 25 7 48
19 48 3 13 6 20 1 33 37 12 61 63 36 34 55 35
21 9 62 15 20 7 24 62 64 9 30 31 1 46 62 60
37 52 30 58 33 46 63 28 38 22 14 36 12 30 10 59
33 36 36 55 66 15 15 56 17 56 62 21 7 39 20 29
30 40 53 59 8 9 62 28 13 31 4 41 44 24 47 51
50 41 5 5 42 40 62 20 36 59 2 41 23 62 25 42
24 66 52 46 24 23 64 8 45 52 59 29 10 4 33 12

.
For a public key, she computes a hyperplane HA, which is a closed subscheme of
projective space P19 over Fq defined by:
x0 − 21x3 − 15x5 − 32x6 + 16x7 − 10x8 + 5x9 + 11x10 + 16x11 + x12 − 4x13
−28x14 − 20x15 + 18x16 + 8x17 + x18 + 32x19
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containing the image of σ(s)A and also computes an embedding
σ
(p)
A : P
1 ×P1 → P19
represented by the matrix
M(p)A =

28 32 4 38 26 36 6 20 1 2 22 27 23 35 10 24
29 3 48 59 19 11 17 23 10 61 12 50 21 17 46 35
27 21 45 43 33 48 4 43 64 37 34 46 60 3 41 27
4 45 65 55 6 40 11 30 41 31 19 23 42 41 11 1
53 14 44 37 15 49 57 26 55 22 29 45 44 9 59 30
45 60 22 66 26 27 60 60 54 63 62 64 4 18 44 18
42 33 47 53 52 65 45 28 5 21 58 45 49 31 22 27
30 13 6 6 37 40 38 51 2 43 61 6 52 4 48 34
66 54 47 64 13 20 66 23 31 36 55 42 11 27 39 17
29 28 31 44 54 9 60 44 64 1 59 12 38 41 57 32
10 18 2 58 38 5 35 14 55 16 22 61 18 13 55 46
28 53 39 66 55 0 46 21 7 49 30 1 60 15 37 63
54 24 9 29 24 42 51 50 35 10 50 18 16 44 10 7
64 24 63 33 49 14 47 35 33 30 59 4 20 24 66 1
59 37 43 25 55 7 21 26 62 44 64 45 66 4 46 62
7 47 2 13 0 40 21 1 11 7 56 14 60 41 21 62
51 20 31 4 55 36 27 22 61 42 32 51 56 20 26 5
36 46 36 42 59 65 33 58 43 20 40 50 15 7 11 63
18 15 53 12 3 8 50 66 55 39 42 8 10 31 1 29
66 34 55 50 26 57 3 35 30 41 39 55 35 40 40 27

Bob chooses a random integer m1 = 70 (for sake of brevity, in the present
example, we have chosen only one automorphism instead of two), computes an
automorphism MB = A
m1
1 of the variety VA and then a σ-embedding
σB : P1 ×P1 → P19
represented by the matrix
MB =

46 26 7 53 4 8 3 63 15 66 49 2 4 9 56 4
61 24 1 50 17 19 48 28 38 45 44 35 36 49 4 48
22 28 65 20 18 24 4 65 37 17 57 7 29 59 20 35
58 21 5 64 66 8 17 20 27 17 14 50 53 40 28 18
25 56 30 19 39 62 44 21 37 1 22 43 8 13 30 19
43 14 16 44 60 60 21 10 48 65 53 20 46 12 35 44
27 52 64 40 51 25 13 62 48 57 53 14 43 25 42 50
38 56 61 42 26 42 29 20 23 34 56 34 29 60 25 24
15 35 27 50 4 7 56 25 66 36 47 38 38 41 3 28
10 38 43 46 56 37 28 48 44 51 23 52 5 48 22 50
34 50 50 37 12 29 11 40 31 5 52 13 53 58 29 52
37 20 40 22 49 37 58 0 8 19 26 34 52 35 19 53
19 39 22 65 5 7 62 35 51 43 16 35 48 43 38 44
60 3 49 48 44 9 39 26 39 50 24 53 52 4 0 43
0 23 54 63 27 26 59 23 8 50 62 42 37 48 26 60
5 14 33 28 36 24 17 18 15 47 30 49 37 34 55 16
59 57 9 62 38 57 61 30 5 13 58 64 36 40 18 61
38 48 39 43 40 9 35 51 14 40 60 61 50 2 25 22
38 51 37 66 26 25 40 6 64 22 62 16 12 57 14 9
21 15 48 53 36 20 29 25 18 18 2 0 62 64 36 63

He also computes a hyperplane HB, which is again the closed subscheme of pro-
jective space of dimension over Fq defined by:
x0 + 4400x1 + 4433x2 + 8909x3 + 26482x4 + 3162x5 − 4113x6 + 24289x7
−15946x8 + 4813x9
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and is identifed by an element of coker(MB).
Key Exchange:
Bob computes the pullback
σ∗BHA = 12x
3
0x
3
2 + 2x
2
0x1x
3
2 + 13x0x
2
1x
3
2 − 7x31x32 + 26x30x22x3 + 29x20x1x22x3
− 19x0x21x22x3 + 16x31x22x3 + 29x30x2x23 − 30x0x21x2x23 + 9x31x2x23
− 26x30x33 + 12x20x1x33 − 22x0x21x33 − 24x31x33
and finds a component of bi-degree (2,2)
C1 = −x20x22 + 6x0x1x22 + x21x22 + 28x20x2x3 − 12x0x1x2x3 + 30x21x2x3 − 4x20x23
− 24x0x1x23 − 9x21x23
and computes the j-invariant jB = j(C1) = 57 ∈ Fq. Alice computes the pull-
back
σ(s)
∗
A HB = −32x20x1x32 − 15x0x21x32 + 24x31x32 − 7x20x1x22x3 − 16x0x21x22x3
− 29x30x2x23 + 19x20x1x2x23 − 11x0x21x2x23 − 16x31x2x23 − 27x30x33
− 5x20x1x33 − 7x0x21x33 + 26x31x33
and finds a component of bi-degree (2,2)
C2 = 33x0x1x22 + x
2
1x
2
2 − 23x0x1x2x3 − 2x21x2x3 + 32x20x23 − 19x21x23
and computes the j-invariant jA = j(C2) = 57 ∈ Fq, which is the common key.
This version of the algorithm has some practical issues: the memory
required to reach a good level of security is remarkably larger than the
one needed by some of the most practical existing post-quantum cryp-
tosystems, like lattice based ones and SIDH. In fact each user has a public
key comprehensive of matrices of large size over Fq. Another issue is the
speed of the key exchange, in particular the bottleneck is the computation
of products of big matrices.
4.2 QSI algorithm second version
In this section we describe some modifications of the previous algorithm
which significantly improve the speed of the key exchange. It is not clear
that whether this makes the protocol prone to some attacks by the extra
information revealed.
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Experimental evidence shows that the computationally heavy part of
the key exchange is the calculation of M′B: it is required to compute powers
of matrices of large size. By choosing A1, A2 to be generalized permuta-
tion matrices, Alice can dramatically speed up the computations of this
product of matrices. This can be achieved by choosing A′1, A
′
2 and MA to
be generalized permutation matrices. A drawback is that the order of Ai
is bounded by 4(q− 1). So in this context, Alice should use a much larger
value of q to reach the same level of security.
Besides the improvement in the speed of the key exchange, the main
issue remains the size of the public key. The major contribution to this
size is by the matrix M(p)A , which requires around l · (m + 1)2 · (m+33 ) bits,
where l is the binary length of q. For example in the case l = 64, m = 8
this values is 855360, which is unpractical. A problem is to reduce the size
of M(p)B , which can be achieved by taking sparse or small entry matrices.
5 QSI Key Exchange with TTP
In this section we describe a variation of the key exchange where a trusted
third party is allowed. TTP are not used in the design of the most com-
mon key exchange protocols, on the other hand they are required in sev-
eral real-life applications. The advantage of the TTP (which will be called
”Trent”) in the case of the QSI key exchange protocol is that it allows the
users to have a high level of security with a considerably short public key
size and less time in common key generation.
Trent secret data:
• A Veronese variety VT ⊂ P(m+33 )−1 for m ∈N.
Trent public data:
• A finite field Fq.
• A positive integer m.
• A matrix MT of size (m+33 )× (m+ 1)2 representing a σ-embedding of
P1 ×P1 into VT.
• Two (m+33 ) × (m+33 ) matrices T1, T2 representing automorphisms of
VT of order q4 − 1.
Suppose that a user U wants to register to Trent’s key exchange system.
Then U has to:
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1. Download Trent’s public data.
2. Choose random integers 1 ≤ mU1 , mU2 , m′U1 , m′U2 ≤ q4 − 1 and to com-
pute MU := T
mU1
1 T
mU2
2 T
m′U1
1 T
m′U2
2 . This corresponds to the choice of a
σ-embedding σU : P1 ×P1 → P(m+33 )−1 such that Im(σU) ⊂ VT.
3. Compute a random HU ∈ coker(MU). This corresponds to the choice
of a hyperplane containing Im(σU).
Suppose that Alice and Bob want to generate a common key, then:
1. Alice downloads Bob’s public key HB, she computes σ∗AHB and she
finds a component of bi-degree (2, 2). Then she computes its j-invariant
jA.
2. Bob downloads Alice’s public key HA, he computes σ∗BHA and he
finds a component of bi-degree (2, 2). Then he computes its j-invariant
jB.
Now, jA = jB is the common key of Alice and Bob.
Remark 5.1. HU is the public key. Its binary length is (m+33 ) · l, where l is the
binary length of q. For example, imposing (m+33 ) − (m + 1)2 − 1 coefficients
equal to 0 and one coefficient equal to 1, HU can be described by l(m + 1)2 bits.
For l = 64 and m = 8 it is equal to 5184 bits: shorter than in SIDH or NTRU at
128-bit security level.
6 Underlying mathemtical problems
Suppose that an eavesdropper Eve wants to break the protocol. Then she
has the following possible options:
1. She can try to find explicitly the Veronese variety, i.e. the (m+33 ) ×
(m+33 ) matrix MU in the version without TTP or MT in the TTP ver-
sion. Note that, in the case of TTP version, if Eve is able to solve this
problem, then she is able to break any communication between two
users of the Trent system.
2. She can try to find M(s)U in the version without TTP, or MU in the
version with TTP. Note that, in the case of TTP version, if Eve is able
to solve this problem, then she is able to break any communication
between U and other users of the Trent system.
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3. She can find the explicit equations of VA = MAV3,m in the version
without TTP, or of VT in the version with TTP. Then she can try to
attack the single communication between Alice and Bob by search-
ing the primary components of VA ∩ HA ∩ HB (without TTP) or VT ∩
HA ∩ HB (with TTP).
Suppose that Eve wants to follow the first option. Also, suppose that
we are in the case of the TTP version (in the other case, the problem is com-
pletely analogous). A possible attempt is to find MT by solving a system
of polynomial equations: she writes MT as a matrix of (m+33 )
2
unknowns.
The condition that Ti is an automorphism of VT means that
Ti MT = MT GLEmb(3, m)(A)
for some matrix A ∈ GL(4). If Eve eliminates the variables {aij}, then she
gets polynomial conditions of extremely high degree on mi,j (note that
MT GLEmb(3, m)(A) is a matrix whose components are bi-homogeneous
polynomials whose bi-degree is (1, m) in the set of variables {mij} and
{aij}). The condition that σU is a σ-embedding such that Im(σU) ⊂ VT
means that
σU = MT ◦ v3,m ◦ A ◦ s1,1
for some A ∈ Aut(P3). Note that, like above, the matrix ME representing
the σ-embedding MT ◦ v3,m ◦ A ◦ s1,1 is a matrix whose components are
bi-homogeneous polynomials whose bi-degree is (1, m) in the set of vari-
ables {mij} and {aij}. If Eve eliminates the variables {aij}, then she gets
polynomial conditions of extremely high degree on {mij}.
Suppose that Eve chooses the second option to attack the system. Then
she wants to find mU1 , m
U
2 , m
′U
1 , m
′U
2 such that
HU ∈ coker
(
Tm
U
1
1 T
mU2
2 T
m′U1
1 T
m′U2
2
)
.
Since the product of matrices is non-commutative, it seems that meth-
ods similar to Pollard rho or baby-step giant-step are not possible in this
case. Since the family of quadric surfaces of P3 is a 9-dimensional pro-
jective space, using a brute force attack (just choosing random values of
mU1 , m
U
2 , m
′U
1 , m
′U
2 ), Eve should find a σ-embedding σE such that Im(σE) =
Im(σU) in around q9 trials (instead of q16 as one would expect).
Suppose that Eve wants to choose the third option: she has first to
compute the polynomial equations defining VT. This is not a hard prob-
lem because VT is defined by m(m2 − 1)(m3 + 12m2 + 59m + 66) degree-2
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homogeneous polynomials by proposition D.1 and that can be found by
the methods of linear algebra. After this, one needs to find the irreducible
components of the variety VT ∩ HA ∩ HB, this corresponds to find the pri-
mary decomposition of the ideal generated by the quadratic polynomials
defining VT and the two linear polynomials defining respectively HA and
HB.
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A Probability that a random curve of bi-degree
(2,2) in P1×P1 is singular.
Let κ be an algebraically closed field, then a general curve C ⊂ P1 ×P1 of
bi-degree (2, 2) is non-singular. More precisely:
Proposition A.1. Let
S := {aijX2−i0 Xi1Y2−j0 Y j1 = 0 : i, j ∈ {0, 1, 2}, aij ∈ κ}
be the set of curves of bi-degree (2,2) defined over K. Identify C ∈ S with its
coefficients (up to scalar multiplication) [aij] ∈ P8. Then the condition of being
singular is closed in the Zariski topology of P8, i.e. is defined by a set of homoge-
neous polynomial equations in [aij].
The above proposition states that singular curves are very few com-
pared to the smooth ones. You may imagine sets defined by polynomial
equations in Rn or Cn: these sets have a smaller dimension than the one
of the ambient space, so their measure is 0. A similar situation occurs for
algebraically closed fields. If we consider curves defined over a finite field
Fq then the probability of being singular is not 0, but it should decrease
when q increases and it should be negligible when q is very large.
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B j-invariant of a (2, 2)-curve in P1×P1
A standard result in the theory of algebraic curves is that there is a bijection{
genus 1 curves up
to isomorphism.
}
←→
{
4-tuples of distinct points of P1
up to automorphism.
}
see for example [12, 19.5]. Let [C] be an isomorphism class of genus 1
curves. Let pi : C → P1 be any degree 2 morphism. Then the 4-tuple of
points associated to C is the branch locus of pi, which are by definition the
points P ∈ P1 such that #pi−1(P) = 1.
Example B.1. Let E be the elliptic curve defined by the equation Y2Z = f (X, Z),
where f (X, Z) = (X− aZ)(X− bZ)(X− cZ), let
E P1
[X : Y : Z] [X : Z]
pi
be the degree 2 map toP1. The branch locus of pi is the set {[1 : 0], [a : 1], [b : 1], [c : 1]}.
Example B.2. Let C ⊂ P1 ×P1 be a smooth curve of bi-degree (2,2) and let
C P1
(P, Q) P
pi
be the first projection map. Let
F(X0, X1; Y0, Y1) = Y20 F0(X0, X1) +Y0Y1F1(X0, X1) +Y
2
1 F2(X0, X1)
be the defining polynomial of C. Then the branch locus of pi is the set of points
P = [p0, p1] for which the equation
F(p0, p1; Y0, Y1) = 0
has one (double) solution. Equivalently F(p0, p1, Y0, Y1) is a quadratic binary
form with vanishing discriminant. So [p0 : p1] is a root of the binary quartic
form
G(X0, X1) := F1(X0, X1)2 − 4F0(X0, X1)F2(X0X1)
The invariants of a binary quartic form under the action of GL(2) is classically
well known (see for example [7, 199,p.189], [1, 2.2], or [6, 10.2]): if we write
G(X0, X1) = q0X40 + q1X
3
0X1 + q2X
2
0X
1
1 + q3X0X
3
1 + q4X
4
1
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and we define
S := q0q4 − q1q34 +
q22
12
T :=
q0q2q4
6
+
q1q2q3
48
− q
3
2
216
− q0q
2
3
16
− q
2
1q4
16
then
S3
S3 − 27T2 is the invariant of G under the action of GL(2) or equivalently
the invariant of the set of points given by the roots of G under the action of
PGL(2). This is equal to the j-invariant of the curve C.
C Irreducibility of curves of bi-degree (d, d).
The pullback of a hyperplane H through a σ-embedding is a curve of bi-
degree (m, m) in P1 ×P1, which has a component of bi-degree (2, 2). An
important task is to have a well defined key exchange is to know if the
residual (m− 2, m− 2) curve is irreducible or not. We can assume that this
residual curve is randomly chosen among the curves of bi-degree (m −
2, m− 2), so a general question is: what is the probability that a curve of
bi-degree (d, d) in P1 ×P1 is irreducible?
D Irreducible components of VT ∩ HA ∩ HB
The next proposition gives the implicit description of any Veronese variety
as intersection of quadric hypersurfaces of the ambient space. Without loss
of generality, we can suppose that it is the standard Veronese variety. In
this section, some technical terms from algebraic geometry are used.
Proposition D.1. The Veronese variety V3,m is an intersection of
hm := m(m2 − 1)(m3 + 12m2 + 59m + 66)
linearly independent quadric hypersurfaces.
Proof. First of all we need to compute h0(IV3,m(2)). Since V3,m is projec-
tively normal, then
h0(IV3,m(2)) = h0(OPN3,m (2))− h0(OV3,m(2))
= h0(O
P
N3,m (2))− h0(OP3(2m))
=
1
2
[(
m + 3
3
)
+ 1
] (
m + 3
3
)
−
(
2m + 3
3
)
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which is equal to the desired value.
Example D.2. For m = 8 there are 12726 linearly independent quadric hy-
persurfaces containing V3,m. It is the condition in the linear system of quadric
surfaces of PN3,m of codimension 969.
A possible approach to find the quadratic equations defining VT is to
generate dm − hm points of VT, where dm is the dimension of the space of
all quadric hypersurfaces, sufficiently random points inside VT: this can
be done easily using the knowledge of the σ-embedding and of some of its
automorphisms. After that one can find a basis of the family of quadratic
polynomials vanishing on those points. These quadratic polynomials gen-
erate the ideal IVT .
Proposition D.3. V3,m ⊂ PN3,m is a 3-dimensional projective variety of degree
m3.
Proof. In general deg(Vn,m) = mn, see for example [8, 4.2.7]
After the computation of the primary components of VT ∩ HA ∩ HB,
Eve has to find the j-invariant of the component of degree 4m. This is
explained by the next proposition.
Proposition D.4. The image of a curve of bi-degree (2, 2) through a σ-embedding
P1 ×P1 → P(m+33 )−1 is a curve of degree 4m.
Proof. In fact it is projectively equivalent to the image of a curve of bi-
degree (2,2) under the map
|OP1×P1(m, m)| : P1 ×P1 → P(m+1)
2−1.
The degree of the image is (2, 2) · (m, m) = 4m.
In conclusion, VT ∩ HA ∩ HB is reducible curve of degree m3 with a
component of degree 4m. In order to break the system with this informa-
tion, the eavesdropper needs to find
1. the irreducible decomposition of VMA3,m ∩ HA ∩ HB;
2. the irreducible component of degree 4m and compute its j-invariant.
